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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AN IMPACT OF SELF-ASSESSMENT BUDGETARY PROGRAM  
ON BUDGET DECISIONS IN KOREA 
 
 
By 
 
Jisu Kim 
 
 This paper aims to investigate the impact of Self-assessment Budgetary Program (SABP), a 
representative assessment tool of the public budgetary program in Korea. Multivariate analysis was 
conducted, focusing on 401 assessed budgetary programs in 2015 that were matched with budget data 
of FY 2014-2016, while controlling for the program characteristics and political content. The result 
shows the statistically significant impact of SABP on the budget decision. In particular, this impact is 
stronger when the program’s budget size is initially large or middle rather than small. Although 
planning and management evaluation components have statistically significant to outcomes, the result 
component does not. Also, the impact of planning component is much bigger than management 
component. Therefore, this performance evaluation system and its management, the evaluation 
process should be improved in order to reflect the real performance of the program. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 Budgeting is crucial for policy process. Public budget is the plan for the government’s 
objectives and goals including an estimate of resources required within a definite period and available 
resources (Smith and Lynch 2004). Also, Wildavsky (1961) suggested that budgeting is more likely 
based on political decision making rather than economic condition so budgeting itself includes 
government’s activities, political strategies, policy decision and future prospectus. In this regard, 
budgeting is a complex decision-making process that considers many factors, such as political or 
managerial issue. Therefore, budgeting system has continuously evolved in order to improve 
budgeting system to be systematical and logical. Due to recent trends and emerging phenomena since 
the 1990s such as the global economic crisis and the aging society, governments suffer from a public 
budget deficit and it also emphasized the necessity of improving efficiency and effectiveness of public 
expenditure.  
 Performance budgeting system is one of the main systems that were implemented as part of 
modern fiscal reform. Performance-based budgeting system is a mechanism of enhancing the linkage 
between the performance of the budgetary program and budget allocation based on the assumption 
that performance evaluation can improve government performance, improve outcomes, strengthen 
accountability and enhance transparency of budgeting process (Krietensen, Groszyk, and Buhler, 
2002). Since Korean government introduced performance-based budgeting in 2003, performance 
budgeting system in Korea has been developed in accordance with the Korean context. Korea is 
currently ranked first among OECD countries in terms of good performance-based budgeting 
practices.  
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Figure1.1 OECD Index of Performance Budgeting Practices in the National Level 
 
 
 
          Source: OECD Government at a Glance, 2017 
 
 Performance-based budgeting system can be a tool for improving public spending and 
managing public budgetary program by evaluating individual programs to enhance performance. 
Under this performance budgeting system, government policies which have good performance and 
high returns to society can be sustainable while the budget itself could be allocated systemically 
regardless of changes in governments in power. Also, under the performance evaluation system and its 
management, the evaluation process should be valid and well-developed in order to improve the 
effectiveness of performance-based budgeting program overall and enhance long-term fiscal 
sustainability. 
 The Korean government argues that performance information is significantly considered for 
budget decision (Cho, 2010). However, some researchers and experts point out that the Korean 
performance budgeting system has a tendency to become lenient in the evaluation, leading to scoring 
inflation or underreporting unsatisfactory programs (Park, 2009) (MOSF 2016). A survey among 
government officers who answer the self-assessment questionnaires administered under the SABP 
shows their respective authors’ skeptical view on the validity of Korean performance budgeting (Jung, 
2012) (Oh, 2017). 
 Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the SABP, which is Korea’s representative performance 
budgeting system, by examining its impact on budgetary decisions. This research aims to build upon 
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the results of previous studies in Korea. For this research, looks into the 401 budgetary program 
assessed in 2015 in relation to budget data from FY 2014-2016 budget data, gathered from the MOSF. 
This research is focused on 1) identifying whether Korean performance budgeting linked budget 
decisions with performance, 2) what factors may impact on SABP program-managerial practices and 
program performance within spending organizations of the Korean central government. 
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Ⅱ. Background of Performance Budgeting  
2.1 Origins of Performance-based Budgeting System 
 
 Unlike private enterprises, government and public agencies are generally not oriented 
towards enhancing profit and have no strong incentive to base the budget on the performance of 
government programs. Often, legislatures and executive budget agencies allocate limited budget 
resources without knowing which programs need more and which deserve less, thus it becomes 
difficult to increase the effectiveness and efficiency. Based on this problem V. O. Key (1940) 
lamented the absence of a proper budgetary theory to guide proper resource allocation. This lack of 
objective criteria to help make proper budget decision led to the interest in performance measurement 
and performance-based budgeting (Melkers and Willoughby, 1998). 
 In the late 1980s, most of OECD countries experienced increased government debt and 
budget deficit. Due to a deepening recession across the world, demand for public services increased 
even though revenues were limited and even scarce (Cho, 2010). An increase in the aging population 
also exhausted the public budget and increased public debt (Kim, 2012). To alleviate this difficult 
situation, governments concentrated on enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. 
Since then, governments have shown an increasing tendency to shift from detailed input control to a 
more results-oriented budget management. As a consequence, performance budgeting has regained the 
attention which it originally received in the 1960s. The new performance budgeting models aim to 
improve the performance of government operations by associating budget decisions with performance. 
 In the 2000s, many OECD countries adopted performance budgeting system with the goal of 
enhancing linkage between budget allocation on each program and program performance (Curristine, 
2005). Among the most prominent performance-based system was introduced by the US federal 
government through the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in 2002
1
 in order to assess the 
performance of programs which uses public funding. So far, 50% of OECD countries have begun 
                                           
1
 The first Performance management budgeting system in United States was Government Performance and 
Results Act (103 P.L. 62; 107 Stat. 285) which were enacted in 1993. However, PART is considered as a 
representative performance-based budgetary program and it was benchmarked in some OECD countries. 
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using performance measurement results in order to set program priorities and to allocate budgets 
among programs (Curristine, 2005).  
 Metzenbaum (1998) presented two benefits of performance-based budgeting. First, 
performance-based systems intend to improve program’s outcome. Following each stage of 
performance-based budgeting, evaluation can boost outcomes by increasing awareness of problems, 
clarifying goals and measures to improve direction and expectations. Outcomes can be improved 
through the performance-based system process by learning programs and gathering information to 
improve their activities (Metzenbaum, 1998). 
 Another benefit of the performance-based system is an improvement in accountability and 
transparency. Evaluation mechanisms encourage government agencies to take responsibility for the 
consequences of their performance. Furthermore, improved transparency comes along with increased 
accessibility of performance information. In budget decision-making, this information should be 
accessible and open to people. In turn, performance-based systems are also characterized by flexibility 
and fairness since it focuses on results rather than the process and decreases inconsistencies in 
inspections (Metzenbaum, 1998; Buell and Tortorella, 2011) 
 
 
2.2 Performance budgeting history in Korea  
In Korea, comprehensive budget process reforms were introduced in the early 2000s. The 
four major fiscal reforms were: 1) Medium Term Expenditure Framework, 2) Top-down budgeting, 3) 
Performance-oriented Budgeting, and 4) Digital Budget and Accounting System. The reforms aimed 
to promote the effectiveness of performance-oriented management of expenditure programs and 
enhance the long-term fiscal sustainability of Korea. Among these fiscal reforms, Performance-based 
budgeting was introduced in four phases and was continuously refined to reflect political 
developments and public finance considerations. 
Initially, performance management system in Korea was launched in 1999 as a pilot project 
with 16 ministries. This system benchmarked the US system’s the Government Performance and 
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Results Act (GPRA), with some revision. Following the US example, each ministry that spent public 
budget was required to produce annual performance plans and reports. However, the political support 
of each ministry was not strong for this “Performance-based Budgeting Project,” thus it was not 
sustained by the change of administration. 
 After a new government came to power in 2003, performance management received a higher 
level of attention and this time, again following the GPRA in the US, another performance 
management system called the “Performance Management System for Budgetary Programs (PMSBP)” 
was introduced in 16 ministries. This system was somewhat advanced than previous pilot project 
since the range of PMSBP was gradually expanded beyond the initial 16 ministries. However, the 
significant difference between the US GPRA and the Korean PMSBP was that while the GPRA 
covered every program including personnel management and operation programs, the PMSBP 
excluded these as well as the strategic plan, which was an integral component of the GRPA. This 
discrepancy comes from an institutional difference between the two countries’ political systems (Kim 
and Park, 2007). 
 Due to this institutional shortcoming, the MPB established a new system for performance 
management which linked performance evaluation to budget allocation. This new budgetary system, 
the Self-assessment Budgetary Program (SABP) was introduced in 2005, patterned after the newer 
Program Assessment Rating Tools (PART) introduced in the US. As its name implies, the SABP is a 
self-assessing system wherein government agencies which are responsible for the expenditure 
programs evaluate the performance of their own programs. The evaluation was done by answering 
questions on a checklist according to three evaluation criteria: planning, management, and results of 
budgetary programs and sub-programs. The MOSF double checked the assessment and used the 
information for both the self-assessment result and the meta-test by the MOSF at the same time. All 
the budgetary programs should be assessed over a three-year period and cover about one-third of 
programs annually (MOSF, 2015). 
In 2016, Korea amended SABP and adopted the Integrated Evaluation System on 
Government Programs (IESGP). The main assessment concept is similar to SABP but it expanded the 
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scale of target programs from one third to all program. Before 2015, the program was classified into 
general budgetary programs, fund programs, R&D programs, and regional development programs. 
Under the previous SABP, each ministry was in charge of evaluating budgetary programs within their 
scope, while the MOSF was responsible for general budgetary programs and special fund programs, 
the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning assessed performance of R&D programs, and the 
Presidential Committee on Regional development was in charge of Regional development programs. 
However, there were many inconsistencies, thus there was a need to amend the SABP towards a more 
comprehensive universal evaluation system. In addition, while the SABP considered both the self-
assessment system by agencies and the meta-test by the MOSF, the IESGP focused only on self-
assessed scores and considered the meta-test only for appraisal, thus reducing inefficiencies and 
increase autonomy and accountability. Also, the number of self-evaluation indicator reduced from 11 
to 4. On the other hand, the evaluation was differentiated considering the program’s characteristics 
and budget size. (MOSF, 2016) 
 
2.3 Self-assessment budgetary program: Evaluation, Strength, and limitation 
The Korean government initiated the Self-Assessment of Budgetary Program (SABP) in 
2005 in order to strengthen the linkage between performance result and budgeting, thus the SABP can 
be considered as somewhat an improvement from the previous system. The MOSF intended to 
restructure or even end some expenditure programs based on performance results. In other words, the 
objective of SABP was to make central government agencies accountable for the performance of their 
programs (Park 2012). 
The SABP evaluation criteria consisted of three sections: Planning, Management, and Result. 
Each evaluation section was accorded different weights: 20, 30, and 50 percent respectively. As of 
2015, the evaluation questionnaire included 11 questions and an additional two questions on IT 
programs, which designated self-assessors in each agency were required to answer (MOSF, 2015). 
Evaluation index and questions are shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Evaluation Questions of the 2015 SABP 
 
    Source: MOSF, 2015 SABP Guidelines. 2015 
 
 Based on this SABP total score, each program under a government agency was classified 
according to total score received. Budgetary programs which achieved higher than 90 were 
categorized as “very satisfactory”, those with 80-90 were “satisfactory”, those that scored 70-80 were 
“fair”, those in the 60-70 range were “unsatisfactory”, and programs with scores of 60 and less were 
categorized as “very unsatisfactory” (MOSF, 2015). The MOSF noted in its 2015 SABP Guidelines 
that programs classified as either “very satisfactory” or “satisfactory” should not exceed more than 20% 
General IT
Program Program
1-1.
Are the program objectives clear and correspond with
accomplishing performance targets?
2 2
1-2.
Is the program unnecessarily similar or overlapping with
other programs?
3 3
1-3.
Does the program have adequate design and efficient
delivery system?
5 5
2-1.
Is there a firm link between performance indicator and
program objectives?
5 5
2-2.
Is the target for performance indicator reasonable and
concrete?
5 5
3-1.
Does the program agency do the best to expense the
budget as planned?
15 12
3-2.
Does the program agency improve efficiency in achieving
program objectives?
5 4
3-3.
Does the program agency operate monitoring system and
make efforts to improve it?
10 8
3-IT1
Does the program agency adequately manage information
management system?
- 3
3-IT2.
Does the program agency make effort establish to fair
and competitive market environment?
- 3
4-1. Is the target level of performance indicator achieved? 30 30
4-2.
Is the program carried out efficiently based on the
evaluation results?
10 10
4-3.
Are the feedbacks from evaluation results and other
external opinion incorporated to improve program
structure?
10 10
3. Adequacy of program management
∙ Performance and feedback
4. Accomplishment of performance objectives and feedback of evaluation results
∙ Planning
Mark
1. Adequacy of program plan
2. Adequacy of performance plan
∙ Management
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of the total within each ministry while the “very unsatisfactory” and “unsatisfactory” group should be 
at least 15% per ministry. 
Also in principle, a reward and punishment system existed within SABP such that programs 
that were found to be unsatisfactory were penalized by cutting up to 10% of previous year’s budget. 
In case of punishment, the budget cut was not automatic, since program characteristics and 
specifications were also considered on a case to case basis. On the other hand, those classified as 
highly satisfactory could be considered for an increase of up to 10% of previous year’s budget.  
 The OECD performance budgeting review compared the Korean SABP to the PART in the 
US and found that the performance budgeting system was taken much more seriously by the Korean 
National Assembly compared with the US Congress since the PART was regarded as a budgeting tool 
for the executive branch which could be simply ignored by the legislature. This difference may be due 
to differences in the constitutional set-up in each country. The US Congress has greater prerogative in 
increasing or decreasing the proposed budget by the Executive compared with the Korean National 
Assembly which has a stricter budgetary ceiling in increasing or decreasing proposals made by the 
Executive branch. Thus, the Korean performance budgetary program (SABP) could work as a 
stronger tool to link performance evaluation and impact to the budget in the following year while 
many countries could not materialize the performance-oriented budgeting (Park and Brumby, 2012)  
The SABP has evolved in accordance with the Korean context. Among OECD, Korea is 
considered as first in terms of utilizing performance information on the budget. However, some 
researchers pointed out the problems and limitations of Korean performance budgetary program. First, 
the number of assessed programs is fluctuating and the sampling is not balanced (Park and Won, 
2012). Second, it’s hard to see that SABP enhanced the overall performance of government budgetary 
significantly (Park, 2015). Third, many SABP scores were found to have been inflated (MOSF, 2016).  
There appears to have been little improvements made in addressing these problems, based on 
the most recent 2015 SABP Assessment Report result, which found similar trends and issues. First, 
there was a decreasing trend in the number of SABP assessed program. Also, the sampled programs 
were not balanced in terms of the purpose of program and budget type. Table 2.2 shows the 
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descriptive statistics of SABP program and the ratio of the budget. According to this result, SABP 
program only observed around 8% of all programs, amounting to only 12.2% of the total budget size. 
Among the classified group by program purpose, less than 5% of programs classified under Science 
and Technology, Land and Regional Development, and Administration were assessed. On the other 
hand, programs under Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Communication, and Environment exceed 
more than 10%. Even worse, less than 1% of the total budget was assessed under SABP programs 
classified under Science and Technology, Land and Regional Development, Culture and Tourism, and 
Administration. This shows the gross imbalance of scope among SABP assessed programs. 
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of SABP sampled programs 
 
         Data source: MOSF 
Total Government
Budgetary Program
SABP Program
Observasion
Observation
Ratio
Budget
Ratio
Public order & security 430 25 5.81% 9.70%
Science & technology 307 11 3.58% 1.09%
Education 246 22 8.94% 7.43%
Transportation 479 35 7.31% 18.75%
Defense 275 19 6.91% 10.78%
Land & regional
development
134 6 4.48% 1.65%
Agriculture, forestry
&fishery
572 60 10.49% 7.43%
Culture & tourism 377 37 9.81% 0.74%
Health care 349 32 9.17% 5.47%
Welfare 804 73 9.08% 24.07%
Industry, SME & energy 541 34 6.28% 8.68%
Diplomacy & reunification 205 18 8.78% 15.17%
Administration 857 40 4.67% 0.90%
Communication 189 20 10.58% 14.35%
Environment 251 34 13.55% 29.91%
Total 6016 466 7.75% 12.23%
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 Second, the KIPF report pointed out that there were no mechanisms implemented to improve 
the performance after SABP and back up the check for unsatisfactory group programs. It would be 
difficult to find out whether that overall performance of government budgetary programs was 
enhanced significantly or not. However, the average scores of the SABP were 62.7 in 2010, 64 in 
2011, 62.9 in 2012, 65.3 in 2013, 65.3 in 2014, and 69.5 in 2015. Also, we could see the result 
component score has been improved since 2012. 
 
Table 2.3 State of SABP Results by Evaluation Components
 
  
 Third, there was also a tendency of evaluating the program as “moderate” or neither too 
positive nor too negative. The proportion of assessed budgetary programs which were evaluated as 
“moderate” was almost 70% from 2010 to 2014, except in 2011. This tendency has persisted since the 
beginning of SABP implementation; from 2005 to 2011 around 80% budgetary programs were 
assessed as “moderate.” This suggests that ministries and government organizations became 
conservative in self-assessing their programs. Park and Won (2012) noted that MOSF saw that central 
agencies were too generous in assessing programs in the period of 2005-2007 and so ordered them to 
be stricter in their self-assessment after 2008. This tendency was addressed as MOSF set specific 
mandatory limits on the proportion of unsatisfactory and satisfactory assessments per agency.  
Year Total score
Program
planning
Performance
planning
Management Result
2010 62.7 92 70.1 65.9 55.1
2011 64 95.9 79.2 53.9 61.5
2012 62.9 96.8 73 65.7 53.6
2013 65.3 61 59.5
2014 65.3 61.7 59.7
2015 69.5 64.8 64.7
Source: MOSF(2011-2015), KIPF(2014)
88.1
88.3
88.4
17 
Table 2.4 Summary of SABP Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Unit: programs, %)
Year
"Unsatisfactory"
group
"Moderate"
group
"Satisfactory"
group
Total
2010
116
(24.5%)
335
(70.8%)
22
(4.7%)
473
2011
118
(30.4%)
245
(63.0%)
26
(6.7%)
389
2012
112
(23.6%)
330
(69.6%)
32
(6.8%)
474
2013
144
(24.1%)
424
(71%)
29
(4.9%)
597
2014
91
(18.8%)
363
(75%)
30
(6.2%)
484
2015
101
(21.7%)
283
(60.75)
82
(17.6%)
466
Source: MOSF
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Ⅲ. Literature Review 
   3.1 Performance-based budgeting as a valid tool for performance evaluation 
 
 Many studies explore the impact of performance budgeting and validity as a tool of 
performance evaluating measures. Curristine (2005) examines challenges and success factors for 
performance budgeting system implementation and how this performance information is used in the 
budget process. In her paper, she argues that performance budgeting system has many limitations as a 
budgetary tool, noting that majority of countries where the performance information is available do 
not consider this as a major determinant factor for budget allocations. Rather such information is only 
used along with other information in budgeting process due to lack of means to integrate it into the 
budget process.  
 In order to ensure the success and effectivity of performance budgeting, a number of studies 
highlight key requirements. Cho (2015) emphasized that incentive can be a good solution for exacting 
accountability and intended performance. Kelly and Rivenbark (2014) also state that good 
performance measurement and reporting system is the foundation for performance budgeting but 
simply reporting performance result in the budget document does not constitute performance 
budgeting. Kim (2013) assessed the appropriateness of certain performance indicator using available 
performance information. The study revealed that the understanding of self-assessment differs among 
agencies and ambiguous performance goal restrict clear performance budgeting system. 
  
   3.2 Impact of performance-based budgeting system on budget decision 
 Regarding the impact of performance budgeting system, most of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence shows that it has a positive impact on the budget decision. In the U.S. case, 
Gilmour and Lewis (2005) examined the impact of Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART), 
using budget data from FY2005 to FY2007. They found that PART scores have a larger impact on 
small- and medium-sized programs than on large programs. In addition, the result component of 
PART scores has a smaller impact on budget decisions compared with the program purpose 
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component. In particular, Gilmour and Lewis (2006) focused on the influence of political content on 
budget choices. According to this paper, once budget choices were modeled to allow the political 
content of programs to influence not only budgets but also the PART scores themselves, it became 
harder to disentangle the unique influence of the scores on budgets. Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa (2006) 
also pointed out how presidents are engaged in the strategic distribution of federal budget and also 
provide good evidence in support of partisan theories of budget allocation. Nonetheless, Klase and 
Dougherty (2008) tested as to what extent the implementation of performance-based budgeting has 
had an impact on the actual allocation of resources in the form of constant per capita. The finding 
shows that the implementation of performance budgeting has a statistically and positively significant 
impact on budget outcomes in US states as measured by constant per capita expenditure which means 
performance budgeting system helps to enhance the performance of public budgetary programs. 
 Park and Choi (2010) studied whether the program assessment results affect the future 
budgets of programs during FY 2004 to 2007. The PART result had an impact on the budget 
adjustment but not in 2006. This paper concludes that in the early stage, there may have a significant 
impact but could not be sustained for a long-term. In addition, the PART results did not affect the 
budget adjustment process in Congress, thus suggesting that PART result was not respected by the 
legislative branch as it should have been reflected in budget allocation. Sterck (2007) examined the 
effect of performance budgeting on the role of legislatures in the budget process in four countries 
(Australia, Netherlands, Sweden and Canada) and found that performance budgeting initiatives have a 
dominant focus on changing the budget structure but does not successfully changes the budget 
functions. Kelly and Rivenbark (2014) also address that performance information can never be 
determinant in budget decision making unlike political-legal mandates and fiscal constraints which 
are always considered in decision making. 
 In Korea, Ha (2013) studied how the Korean program rating tool effectively deals with the 
characteristic feature of budgetary programs. He focused on eight dimensions of programs, namely: 
tangible vs. intangible services, workload vs. outcome measures, short-term vs. long-term programs, 
policy types, a method of policy implementation, budget size, the duration of programs, and the 
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number of performance indicators. He found the programs that were directly performed by central 
government had better performance than those are not like a subsidy programs , invest or loan 
programs. Also when the program size is bigger and longer the performance of budgetary program 
was better. Park and Choi (2010) also considered Korea’s cultural and socio-economic characteristics 
in the implementation of performance-based budgeting in Korea. They noted that policy implication 
included the performance of strong support from top decision makers and customization of 
performance budgeting system. The Korean case demonstrates the stable, sustainable performance 
budgeting system reform requires capacity building of relevant stakeholders and sometimes 
significant restructuring of the organization. Considering this program’s characteristics and other 
factors that may affect budget allocation, these control variables were included in my research model. 
 Finally, Cho (2010) examined the impact of Korean performance budget system on a 
government program in the early stage of SABP using 2005 and 2007 SABP data. He found that 
SABP score and budget decision have a statistically significant relationship, noting that the 
performance-based budget system was able to influence changes in program managerial practice and 
to improve performance. However, there has been no subsequent assessment of the SABP program to 
reflect recent developments. This research seeks to fill that gap in the current literature. 
 
   3.3 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 Following this preliminary review regarding performance-based budgeting system, this 
research focused on the question of whether the Korean government allocates budget based on the 
SABP results. In other words: Is the Korean budget truly performance-based? The following are the 
initial hypothesis: 
1) SABP scores have a statistically significant impact on a budget especially when the 
budget size is small and middle, rather than on large programs 
2) “Performance” evaluation component of SABP score may have a large impact on the 
budget decision than “Planning” and “Management”  
3) Depending on political content and program’s purpose, the impact of SABP assessment 
result may differ from each other. 
21 
   Ⅳ. Research Design 
   4.1 Data 
 
 This research focuses on the following questions: (1) whether the Korean government 
allocates budget based on the SABP assessment result; and (2) what are the factors that may affect 
SABP assessment result or budget allocation under SABP performance-based budgeting system. 
 Firstly, I examine the relationship between SABP assessment result and government budges 
changes to analysis whether SABP scores have an impact on budget allocation controlling program’s 
characteristics such as budget size, budget type and so on. For this research, I use the 2015 SABP 
assessment results reports provided by Korean ministries and the Korean Government Budget data 
from 2014 to 2016 fiscal years.
2
 The annual SABP reports provide each program’s characteristics, 
program period, budget size and evaluation results. The budget variations, which are approved by 
National Assembly, are expressed as a natural log.  
 In 2014, 3019 expenditure programs were executed, and 466 were evaluated under the SABP 
system. Each of 466 programs was matched to the 2014-2016 budget data. 65 programs out of 466 
programs were dropped out given that 37 programs were not matched with the budget data because 
these programs are subprograms of certain expenditures programs. Additionally, 12 programs were 
eliminated as they were already expired or discontinued due to political or managerial issues. Finally, 
16 programs were dropped out because their budget in 2016 was zero.
3
 In total 401 expenditure 
programs are used as my main sample. Table 4.1 shows that in total, SABP programs are 466 and in 
the main sample there are 401 programs have little difference and t-test result is 0.027. In other words, 
there were no significant differences between two samples in SABP result on average. 
 
 
                                           
2
 All years expressed in this research are based on the fiscal year implemented by the Korean Government. The 
fiscal in Korea is from January to December 
3
 Even though these programs were discontinued in 2016, their evaluation grade is different among them which 
means that their discontinuity is not due to the SABP assessment. 
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Table 4.1 Frequency Distributions of Grade, FY2014 Budgetary Programs 
FY 2014 SABP Total  SABP Sample 
Estimated  
difference 
Very unsatisfactory  
31 23 
0.91% 
6.65% 5.74% 
Unsatisfactory 
70 59 
0.31% 
15.02% 14.71% 
Modest 
283 243 
0.13% 
60.73% 60.60% 
Satisfactory 
65 61 
1.26% 
13.95% 15.21% 
Very satisfactory 
17 15 
0.09% 
3.65% 3.74% 
Total 
466 401   
100% 100%   
   Data source: MOSF 
 
 
4.2 Research Model 
 For the impact evaluation of SABP score on the budget decision, I use the natural log of the 
change in the budget from 2015 to 2016 for each program as a dependent variable Figure 4.1 plots the 
histogram of program budget changes. 
 
Figure 4.1: Histogram of Budget Changes to Assessed Budgetary Programs FY2015-2016. 
 
             Source: MOSF (2015) 
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 Since the main objective of this research is to identify the impact of SABP on budget 
changes, I consider the total weighted SABP score for each program as my main variable of interest. 
The total SABP score is derived by summing the weighted scores for the following sections: program 
planning (20%), program management (30%) and program result (50%) respectively. The mean score 
is 69.4; lowest score is 29.5 of The Ministry of Health and Welfare program has the lowest score 
which is 29.5; and three programs by the Ministry of Education, Rural Administration and Ministry of 
Environment have the highest score which is 98. 
Figure 4.2 Relationship between Budget Changes and SABP Score 
  
(a) Budget changes and SABP score (b) Budget growth rate and SABP score 
Figure 4.2 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between natural SABP score and log 
budget changes from FY 2015 to FY 2016, (a); and SABP score and percentage increase rate (b). In 
graphs, SABP score and the budget decision have a positive correlation which could indicate an 
association between both indicators. However, this relationship is no causal; thus, it is necessary to 
estimate the impact of SABP score on budget decision using regression analysis.  
 
 In this paper, I follow the same strategy as Gilmour and Lewis (2006) to estimate the impact 
of SABP score. They strongly emphasized controlling some factors that could be correlated both with 
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores and budget changes. They controlled for political 
content and program characteristics and considered budget changes from the year before the program 
was assessed. 
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 In order to control for political content, I include a dummy variable that indicates whether 
this expenditure program belongs to presidential agenda or not. If the expenditure program is related 
to the presidential agenda, the government may provide some proxy for the political content of the 
program and support this program.  
 Gilmour and Lewis (2005) emphasized the increase percent rate of the budget before 
program assessment. I also include this variable, i.e., increase percentage rate of program’s budget in 
2014 not just for a measure of a political issue but also control for incrementalism. In any case, the 
literature on incremental budgeting suggests that budget changes by incrementalism are normally 
small. 
 Also, Ha (2000) studied how Korean program performance rating tool effectively deals with 
the characteristic feature of budgetary programs focusing on eight dimensions of the programs. 
Among these eight dimensions, I used budget type and method of policy implementation which were 
coded following the budget type: general account, special account or fund and method of policy 
implementation: direct federal, assets for a citizen or local government, investment and loan. I also 
estimated models with fixed effect for ministries to control for unobservable ministry characteristics 
that can also affect the budget decisions.  
 
 My baseline estimating equation is:  
𝑙𝑛(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑚𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐵𝑃 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛽2%𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑚𝑡𝜇1 + 𝛾𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 ,   (1) 
where 𝑙𝑛(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the natural log of the targeted expenditure budget for program I, in ministry 
m, in the year t; 𝑆𝐴𝐵𝑃 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡−1 is SABP scores of the targeted expenditure program; 𝑋′𝑖𝑚𝑡is a 
vector of control variables such as political contents, program’s characteristics, type of budget etc.; 
𝛾𝑚 is ministry fixed effects; and 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 denotes the error term. 
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Ⅴ. Empirical Finding 
5.1. Impact of SABP assessment on budget decision 
Table 5.1 SABP Scores and Budget Changes for FY 2015-2016 
 
 Table 5.1 presents the regression estimates of equation (1) which show the impact of SABP 
scores on Budget changes for 2015-2016. Column (1) shows a simple OLS regression between budget 
changes and SABP scores and column (2) is a multiple regression analysis with budget increase rate 
before the program was assessed and five controlled variables. Column (3) shows the specification 
including ministry fixed effects. The estimated results in column (2) and (3) show that SABP scores 
exerted a statistically significant impact on the budget decision. This estimate suggests that an 
increase in SABP score by 1 points may lead to a 1.4 to 1.5 percentage increase in budget.  
 Some empirical studies proposed that performance-based budgeting system may have 
different impacts on budget changes following the performance measurement and adequacy of 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
OLS OLS with controls
Fixed effect
with controls
SABP score 0.00848 0.0136*** 0.0149***
(0.00524) (0.00512) (0.00523)
% increase in 2014 0.0541 0.108*
(0.0567) (0.0617)
Political content 0.0756 0.110
(0.144) (0.153)
Project type (Direct) 0.809*** 1.002***
(0.147) (0.169)
Project type (Assist) 0.718*** 0.790***
(0.160) (0.193)
Fund -0.844*** -0.759***
(0.167) (0.186)
Special account -0.306 -0.0987
(0.195) (0.219)
Constant 16.14*** 15.97*** 15.69***
(0.369) (0.401) (0.411)
Ministry fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 802 802 802
R-squared 0.003 0.090 0.217
Mote: Standard errors in parentheses
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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measurement.  
 As it mentioned above, SABP assess is based on three components with different weights for 
each component: planning (20%), management (30%) and results (50%). This different weight system 
may be interpreted as intending that program’s performance (results) should have a larger impact on 
the budget decision than other the two components (planning and management). In order to identify 
how each component of the SABP score has an impact on the budget decision, I include each of these 
indicators instead of the total SABP score in equation (1). Table 5.2 presents the estimates including 
these indicators. 
 
Table 5.2 Impact of SABP Assessment Components on Budget Changes 
 
 It shows that result score which connotes the real performance of project has no statistically 
significant impact on the budget decision but planning and management components have an impact 
and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Also, planning component has a larger impact on 
Budget change
VARIABLES
Planning score 0.0249***
(0.00464)
Management score 0.00739**
(0.00353)
Result score -0.00190
(0.00384)
% increase in 2014 0.0999
(0.0615)
Political content 0.0773
(0.158)
Fund 1.140***
(0.175)
Special account 0.790***
(0.201)
Project type (Direct) -0.758***
(0.194)
Project type (Assist) -0.184
(0.226)
Constant 14.18***
(0.518)
Ministry fixed effects Yes
Observations 760
R-squared 0.250
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the budget decision than management component. Considering the weight of each SABP components 
in the calculation of SABP total score, the planning component overwhelms the SABP assessment 
result. This means that SABP could not fully reflect the performance of government budgetary 
programs. 
 
5.2. Subgroup and Interaction Analysis 
5.2.1 SABP score and budget size 
 In this section, I explore the impact of SABP score on budget size dividing the sample into 
three categories: (1) small size budget, (2) medium size budget, and (3) large size budget. Table 5.3 
shows the subgroup analysis based on the budget size. Based on the budget allocation for 2014, 
budget size groups are categorized as follows: smaller than 6,583,000 won are in the small size 
program group, middle size programs are greater than or equal to 6,583,000 won but smaller than 
39,825,000 won, and larger programs were identified programs greater than or equal to 39,825,000. 
 
Table 5.3 Subgroup Analysis based on Budget Size 
 
Small size program Middle size program Big size program
VARIABLES
SABP Score -0.000109 0.00475 0.0334***
(0.00516) (0.00372) (0.00629)
% increase in 2014 0.135*** 0.261*** 0.436
(0.0435) (0.0379) (0.346)
Political content -0.0480 0.141 -0.0930
(0.130) (0.113) (0.189)
Fund 0.215 0.138 0.564***
(0.160) (0.128) (0.217)
Special account 0.550** 0.239* -0.0656
(0.221) (0.128) (0.219)
Project type (Direct) -0.0316 -0.117 -0.285
(0.227) (0.117) (0.218)
Project type (Assist) 0.173 0.0799 -0.279
(0.251) (0.147) (0.254)
Constant 14.75*** 16.15*** 16.58***
(0.459) (0.272) (0.495)
Ministry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 254 308 240
R-squared 0.264 0.311 0.357
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 The estimates show that only in budgetary programs which are categorized as “large size 
budget group”, SABP score shows statistical significance at the 1 percent level. In contrary, for small 
budget size group and middle budget size group, SABP score does not show a significant impact on 
budget decisions. It means that small or middle-size programs are less likely to be affected by SABP 
score result. 
 Gilmour and Lewis (2005) show that PART scores have a larger impact on small and 
medium-sized programs than on large programs. Also, in the case of the Korean SABP analysis, Ha 
(2012) shows that SABP score has a larger impact on large size program. As some empirical studies 
suggested, the SABP score may impact differently depending on budget size, I included indicators for 
big and middle size programs and interacted these indicators with the SABP score. Table 5.4 shows 
the result of analysis and there is positive coefficient between the interaction terms in large size 
budget and SABP score.  
Table 5.4 Impact of SABP Score on Budget Changes 2015-2016 by Program Size 
 
Budget change
VARIABLES
SABP score -0.00252
(0.00398)
Score*Big size program 0.0284***
(0.00541)
Score*Middle size program 0.00908*
(0.00499)
Other
Political content -0.0284
(0.0577)
Big size program 1.964***
(0.380)
Middle size program 1.081***
(0.351)
Fund 0.353***
(0.0592)
Special account 0.0472
(0.0645)
Constant 14.95***
(0.282)
Observations 1,203
R-squared 0.780
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 It suggests that the impact of SABP scores on a budget is larger for large and middle-size 
programs than for small size programs. Even though large size programs are less likely to be cut and 
penalties due to SABP could be smaller than the small and middle size program, the SABP scores do 
have a significant impact on budget changes more for big size programs. For big budget size programs, 
an increase of 10 points is estimated to increase a program’s budget around 0.2 percentages. For a 
middle size program, the increase is closer to 0.09 percentages. 
 The finding shows that the budget size is the determinant factors in particular, but the initial 
budget size itself does not have a significant impact on SABP score. Analysis result is shown in Table 
5.5. 
Table 5.5 Impact of the Budget Size on SABP Scores 
 
 I re-estimate the impact of SABP on budget decision using budget increase rate as my 
dependent variable. This is done to consider the possibility that the budget size may bias the overall 
impact on the budget. However, there is no statistical significance using budget increase rate as my 
SABP score
VARIABLES
Log budget in 2014 0.517
(0.351)
Other
Political content -0.449
(1.415)
Fund -5.695***
(1.448)
Special account -1.792
(1.589)
Project type (Direct) -0.283
(1.665)
Project type (Assist) -0.946
(1.922)
Constant 63.16***
(6.134)
Observations 401
R-squared 0.040
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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dependent variable.  
 5.2.2 SABP score and Budget type    
 Table 5.6 shows the descriptive statistics based on budget type. Overall, it shows that 
program by general account has a better SABP score on average than that of the special account and 
fund types. However, the budget changes from 2015 to 2016 and the budget increase rate are larger in 
programs based on fund type.  
Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics based on Budget Type 
 
    Data source: MOSF (2015) 
 
 To identify the impact of SABP on a budget considering the budget type, I include an 
interaction term of SABP score and budget type. However, there is no statistically significant impact 
of SABP result with budget type on budget decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General account Special account Fund
SABP score 71.09
(11.27)
69.67
(12.74)
65.88
(12.32)
Budget Change FY
2015-2016
16.38
(1.70)
17.01
(1.60)
17.20
(1.95)
Budget
Increase rate
0.166
(0.88)
0.059
(0.44)
0.196
(1.37)
Ministry direct 0.60 0.68 0.52
Assist 0.23 0.23 0.20
Invest & Loan 
0.16 0.086 0.27
Observasion 633 243 327
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Table 5.7 Impact of SABP Score on Budget Changes by Budget Type 
 
5.2.3 SABP score and Policy 
 Some expenditure program related to welfare, the defense may be less likely to be affected 
by SABP score given that those programs continuously keep a significant size due to their own 
characteristics. On the other hand, programs related to culture or technology may be vulnerable and 
easily affected by SABP score. 
 Programs can be classified into 15 groups following the purpose of programs: Public order & 
security, Science & Technology, Education, Transportation, Defense, Land & regional development, 
Agriculture, forestry &fishery, Culture & tourism, Healthcare, Welfare, Industry, SME & energy, 
Diplomacy & reunification, Administration, Communication and Environment. 
Budget change
VARIABLES
SABP score 0.0119**
(0.00604)
Score*Fund 0.00838
(0.00980)
Score*Special account -0.00700
(0.0105)
Other
Political content 0.0587
(0.117)
Fund 0.270
(0.675)
Special account 1.235*
(0.749)
Project type (Direct) -0.846***
(0.136)
Project type (Assist) -0.306*
(0.159)
Constant 16.07***
(0.449)
Observations 1,203
R-squared 0.094
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
32 
Table 5.8 Descriptive Statistics following the Program Purpose 
 
     Data source: MOSF (2015) 
  
 Table 5.8 shows the descriptive statistics of groups which are classified by program purpose. 
Among 15 groups classified by program purpose, programs related to welfare defense are programs 
whose budget rarely changes. Programs related to culture & tourism and administration represent the 
general budgetary program.  
 Table 5.9 shows the estimates interacting SABP score with the purpose of the programs. 
Column (1) shows that the impacts of SABP assessment score on budget changes controlling by 
Observation Score Budget
Public order &
security
24 68.41 67,600,000      
Science &
technology
10 72.55 9,053,521        
Education 13 72.35 348,000,000    
Transportation 30 65.7 132,000,000    
Defense 15 72.53 229,000,000    
Land & regional
development
5 71.3 12,500,000      
Agriculture,
forestry &fishery
55 72 108,000,000    
Culture & tourism 31 70.01 48,200,000      
Health care 31 66.75 21,700,000      
Welfare 63 65.76 350,000,000    
Industry, SME &
energy
27 67.04 48,400,000      
Diplomacy &
reunification
15 70.96 43,800,000      
Administration 35 70.88 14,100,000      
Communication 13 79.39 24,300,000      
Environment 33 68.57 56,600,000      
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groups that are classified by program purpose. Column (2) includes the interaction term of SABP 
score and program purpose. In column (1) program relate to defense has a positive statistically 
significant impact. On the other hand, Science & Technology and Administration programs are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, in column (2), the interaction 
terms are not statistically significant, overall. 
Table 5.9 Impact of SABP Score on Budget Changes with Program Purpose 
 
Budget change
(1)
Budget change
(2)
VARIABLES
SABP score 0.0126*** 0.0138***
(0.00403) (0.00476)
Score*welfare -0.00737
(0.0108)
Score*Defense 0.00199
(0.0249)
Score*Science&Technology -0.00270
(0.0291)
Score*Culture&Tourism 0.00131
(0.0164)
Score*Administration 0.000605
(0.00268)
Welfare 0.202 0.693
(0.145) (0.729)
Defense 1.723*** 1.580
(0.257) (1.820)
Science and technology -1.087*** -0.890
(0.312) (2.129)
Culture and tourism 0.0523 -0.0365
(0.186) (1.165)
Administration -0.904*** -0.901***
(0.178) (0.179)
Other
Fund 0.702*** 0.703***
(0.121) (0.124)
Special account 0.740*** 0.734***
(0.131) (0.137)
Project type (Direct) -0.802*** -0.805***
(0.134) (0.136)
Project type (Assist) -0.243 -0.244
(0.157) (0.158)
Constant 16.03*** 15.95***
(0.321) (0.366)
(0.159)
Observations 16.07*** 1,203
R-squared (0.449) 0.160
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Ⅵ. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
 Korean government introduced performance-based budgeting in 2003 to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness of public expenditure. Since Self-Assessment of Budgetary Program (SABP) in 
2005 was initiated, it has been developed in accordance with the Korean context. However, some 
studies revealed problems and limitations of SABP system. 
 First, there was a decreasing trend in the number of SABP assessed program. Also, the 
sampled programs were not balanced in terms of the purpose of program and budget type. Second, it 
was difficult to find out whether the performance of government budgetary programs was enhanced 
significantly. Third, there was the tendency of evaluating the program as “moderate” or neither too 
positive nor too negative. 
 Therefore, I examined the relationship between SABP assessment result and government 
budget changes controlling program’s characteristics such as budget size, budget type and so on. I 
used the 2015 SABP assessment results reports provided by Korean ministries and the Korean 
Government Budget data from 2014 to 2016 fiscal years for this analysis.
 
 The estimated results showed that SABP scores exerted a statistically significant impact on 
the budget decision and it suggested that an increase in SABP score by 1 points may lead to a 1.4 to 
1.5 percentage increase in budget. Also, the analysis of each SABP assessment components’ impact on 
budget changes showed that result score had no statistically significant impact on the budget decision 
but planning and management components had an impact. 
 The SABP scores do have a significant impact on budget changes more for big size programs. 
For big budget size programs, an increase of 10 points is estimated to increase a program’s budget 
around 0.2 percentages. For a middle size program, the increase is closer to 0.09 percentages. In 
conclusion, even though this research shows that SABP system has a statistically significant impact 
on the budget decision, other factors like budget size and program type also correlate to this 
mechanism so it may interrupt the performance-based budgeting system in Korea.  
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 Performance-based budgeting system can be a good tool for improving public spending and 
managing public budgetary program by enhancing individual budgetary program’s performance. 
Under this performance budgeting system, government policies which have good performance and 
high returns to society can be sustainable while the budget itself could be allocated systemically 
regardless of changes in governments in power. Therefore, performance evaluation system and its 
management, evaluation process should be valid and well-developed in order to improve the 
effectiveness of performance-based budgeting program overall and enhance long-term fiscal 
sustainability. 
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